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TAKEOVER DEVELOPMENTS -DEFINING "TENDER
OFFER" AND "MANIPULATION" UNDER THE
WILLIAMS ACT
Congress passed the Williams Act' in 1968 to regulate the use of cash
tender offers as a method of acquiring corporate control.2 Prior to the
15 U.S.C. SS 78m(d-(e), 78n(d-(f) (1976) (adding SS 13(d-(e), 14(d)-(f) to Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 ('34 Act), 15 U.S.C. SS 78a-78kk (1976)).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 1711,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2811 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1711]. In passing the Williams Act, Con-
gress recognized that cash tender offers had become a popular method for acquiring con-
trol of publicly held corporations. Id. During the 1960's, the cash tender offer became a
popular takeover device because the securities laws did not require disclosure in connec-
tion with tender offers. Id. at 2812; see Korval, Defining Tender Offers: Resolving A Decade
of Dilemma, 13 SEc. L. REV. 549, 549 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Korval] (abuse of securities
laws, in absence of regulation of tender offers, surged concomitantly with popularity of
tender offer). Although Congress did not define the term "tender offer" for purposes of
applying the Williams Act, the legislative history indicates what type of transaction Con-
gress considered to be a conventional tender offer. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra at 2811.
In a conventional tender offer, an individual or group of individuals offers to purchase a
specified portion of a company's securities at a premium price. See id. The offeror typically
limits the length of time that an offer wil remain open. See id. The offeror also may condi-
tion the offeror's obligation to purchase a company's securities on the tender of an aggregate
number of target shares. See id. If target shareholders tender more than the offer's specified
number of shares, the offeror may, but does not have to, purchase the excess shares. See id.
The Williams Act, §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-f) of the '34 Act, regulates the use of tender
offers as a takeover device. Section 13(d) requires any person acquiring more than 5% of
a company's equity securities registered under the '34 Act to file a schedule 13D with the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) within 10 days of the acquisition. 15 U.S.C. S 78m(d)
(1976) (34 Act, § 13(d)); see id. §§ 78a-78kk (registration requirements under '34 Act). Schedule
13D requires disclosure of an acquirer's identity and background, source of acquisition funds,
extent of beneficial ownership in the solicited company, and any plans that the buyer has
for the company. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1982). Section 13(e) empowers the SEC to
promulgate rules and regulations to define acts and practices that violate S 13 of the '34
Act. 15 U.S.C. S 78m(e) (1976) ('34 Act, § 13(e)); see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. S 240.13e-1 (1982) (rule
regulating purchase of securities by issuer); id. S 240. 13e-3 (rule regulating "going private"
transactions); id. S 240.13e-4 (rule regulating tender offers by issuers). Section 14(d) of the
'34 Act regulates tender offer acquisitions and requires a bidder to file a schedule 14D
with the SEC upon acquiring a target company's securities that result in the bidder's ac-
quisition of 5% or more of a target's equity securities registered under the '34 Act. 15
U.S.C. S 78n(d) (1976) ('34 Act, S 14d)); see id. S 78a-78kk (registration requirements of '34
Act). Schedule 14D, similar to schedule 13D, requires a bidder to disclose the bidder's iden-
tity and background, source of funds, extent of beneficial ownership in a target company,
and plans for the target company. Compare 17 C.F.R. S 240.14d-100 (1982) with id. S 240.13d-101
(disclosure requirements of schedule 13D and schedule 14D). Schedule 14D, unlike schedule
13D, requires a bidder to disclose any transactions or negotiations that the bidder has had
with the target company for a period of time covering the three fiscal years of the target
company immediately preceding the date of schedule 14D filing. Id. § 240.14d-100. Section
14(e) of the '34 Act prohibits certain types of deceptive practices in connection with tender
offers and empowers the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations to define § 14(e) terms.
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Williams Act, provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 ('34 Act)
and the Securities Act of 1933' regulated the corporate takeover methods
of proxy solicitations5 and exchange offers' but did not regulate the use
of cash tender offers.' Congress recognized the gap in the securities laws
15 U.S.C. S 78n(e) (1976) ('34 Act S 14(e)); see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. S 240.14e-1 (1982) (rule pro-
hibiting offerer from holding offer open for less than 20 business days or extending offer
without issuing notice of extension by press release or public announcement); id. § 240.14e-2
(rule establishing date for target company to publish response to bid); id. S 240.14e-3 (rule
prohibiting certain transactions relating to tender offers on basis of material nonpublic
information).
' 15 U.S.C. S§ 78a-78kk (1976).
' Id. §§ 77a-77aa.
' See id. § 78n(a). The purpose of 5 14(a) is to prevent individuals from obtaining
shareholder authorization of corporate action by disclosing misleading or inadequate infor-
mation in proxy solicitation. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964). Section 14(a)
prohibits a company registered under the '34 Act from soliciting proxies from shareholders
in any manner proscribed by rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC. 15 U.S.C. S
78n(a) (1976) ('34 Act, § 14(a)); id. SS 78a-78kk (registration requirements under '34 Act).
Under the rulemaking authority of S 14(a), the SEC has promulgated detailed regulations
establishing the form of proxies and required proxy statement information. See, e.g., 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1982) (information included in written proxy statement); id. S 240.14a-4
(formal requirements of proxy); id. S 240.14a-5 (form of presentation of information in proxy
statement); id. S 240.14a-9 (prohibiting proxy solicitation by use of proxy statement that
is materially misleading). Generally, a corporation seeking to acquire a company must solicit
proxies to obtain approval from the corporation's shareholders by circulating full and ade-
quately disclosed proxy statements. See id.; id. S 240.14a-3. Proxy statements must provide
shareholders with accurate information to enable the shareholders to vote for, or against,
a proposed corporate acquisition on the basis of valid information. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,381-86 (1970) (corporate merger accomplished through material-
ly false proxy statement entitled shareholders to relief); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 433-34 (1964) (same); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381-84 (2d Cir.)
(upholding complaint of shareholders of acquired company alleging that acquiring corpora-
tion accomplished merger by issuing materially defective proxy statement), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1974).
6 See 15 U.S.C. SS 77b, 77e, 77f (1976) (registration requirements under Securities Act
of 1933). Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) defines "offer to sell" to include
any attempt of an individual to dispose of his securities for value. Id. 5 77(b)(3) ('33 Act,
§ 2(3)). When a bidding corporation seeks to exchange its securities for a target company's
securities, the offerer has proposed an exchange offer representing an exchange for value.
See Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Takeover Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regulation, 41
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 499, 501 (1967). Since an exchange offer is an offer to sell within the mean-
ing of the '33 Act, an exchange offeror must comply with the '33 Act's registration re-
quirements. See 15 U.S.C. 5 77e (1976). Section 5 of the '33 Act prohibits any individual
from making an offer to sell a security unless the individual has filed a registration state-
ment with the SEC. Id. S 77e(c) ('33 Act, S 5(c)). The registration statement must include
information concerning the issuer's identity, location of business, names and addresses of
the directors, names and addresses of individuals owning 10% or more of the issuer's
securities, statements of the capitalization of the issuer, and proposed prices for offering
issuer's securities to the public. See id. S 77aa.
See Preface to E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1977) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS] (gap in securities
laws prior to Williams Act). Since securities laws did not regulate cash tender offers before
1200 [Vol. 40:1199
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and amended the '34 Act by enacting the Williams Act to regulate cor-
porate use of the cash tender offer.8 The Williams Act requires offerors
to fully disclose information concerning the offeror's identity,' source of
funds,'" plans for the target company,' and the extent of the offeror's
beneficial ownership in the target company's securities. 2 Congress, in
enacting the Williams Act, concluded that the disclosure provisions would
prevent corporate raiders from secretly acquiring large blocks of a target
company's securities to assure the success of a subsequent takeover bid. 3
1968, Senator Harrison Williams introduced a bill which would require tender offerors to
meet various disclosure requirements. See 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen.
Williams).
' See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7 (history of Williams Act); Korval, supra note 2, at
555 (Williams Act intended to correct existing imbalance between regulatory burdens placed
on target company and burdens placed on offerors). Although the Williams Act provides
substantial protection for target shareholders, Congress did not intend to favor shareholders
but to equate the bargaining positions of offerors and shareholders without favoring either
party. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 28-30 (1977). Since securities laws
prior to the Williams Act adequately protected the interests of bidders and target manage-
ment, Congress enacted the Williams Act to confer new rights on target shareholders to
protect shareholders' interests and to put shareholders on "equal footing" with bidders
and target management. See id. Congress also intended to ensure that investors would ob-
tain information prior to a takeover bid that would enable investors to make meaningful
investment decisions. See Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251-52 (W.D.
Okla. 1972) (active and widespread solicitation of company's stockholders constituted tender
offer under Williams Act because manner of solicitation pressured shareholders into making
ill-considered investment decisions), vacated per stipulation, Civil No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla.
May 8, 1972).
Congress designed the Williams Act to protect investors by requiring that bidders
fully and fairly disclose material facts relevant to a tender offer. See 113 CONG. REC. 854,
24664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). The disclosure requirements protect investors from
unscrupulous corporate raiders who, before the Williams Act, could compel shareholders
to sell shareholders' securities at a premium price without allowing shareholders the time
to make an informed investment decision. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d
579, 597 (5th Cir.) (in absence of adequate disclosure, shareholder might tender shares hastily
without considering risks of investment decision), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); see also
113 CONG. REC. 854, 857-58 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
See 15 U.S.C. S 78(m)(dl(1)(A) (1976) (S 13(d)(1)(A) of '34 Act requires certain individuals
to file information concerning identity and background); id. S 78n(d)(1) (S 14(d)(1) of '34 Act
requires bidder to file information concerning background and identity).
10 See id. S 78m(d)(1)(B) (S 13(dI)(B) of '34 Act requires certain persons to file informa-
tion concerning source of funds used to purchase securities); id. S 78n(d}(1) (S 14(d)(1) of
'34 Act requires disclosure of source of funds used in tender offer acquisition).
" See id. § 78m(d}(1)(C) (§ 13(d)(1)(C) of '34 Act requires purchaser to file information
concerning any proposed major business changes in target company); id. S 78n(d)(1) (5 14(d)(1)
of '34 Act requires tender offeror to state purpose of acquiring control).
12 H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 2, at 2814; see 15 U.S.C. S 78m(d)(1){D) (1976) (§ 13(dl(1)(B)
of '34 Act requires purchaser of securities to state number of shares beneficially owned);
id. § 78n(d)(1) (§ 14 (d)(1) of '34 Act requires tender offeror to state number of shares in
target company beneficially owned).
11 See 113 CONG. REC. 854,857-58 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Kuchel) (disclosure requirements
would prevent takeover pirates from financially plundering target company without
shareholder awareness); see also Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 597 (5th
1983]
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To reinforce the Williams Act's disclosure provisions, Congress drafted
section 14(e) 4 of the '34 Act to prohibit certain types of fraudulent con-
duct in connection with tender offers.'5
Section 14(e) supplements the general antifraud provisions of section
10(b)'6 of the '34 Act by prohibiting any individual from engaging in
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts in connection with any tender
offer." To maintain a section 14(e) claim, litigants must prove that a specific
Cir.) (purpose of Williams Act is to protect investors from unscrupulous corporate raiders
who encourage uninformed shareholder investment decisions), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873
(1974). An offferor, secretly preparing for a takeover bid, may acquire a large block of a
target's stock to provide a substantial basis for a subsequent takeover attempt. See E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 19 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as ARANOW & EINHORN]. Before the Williams Act required mandatory disclosure of pre-tender
offer stock acquisitions, corporate raiders could seize control of a target company with lit-
tle known resources, sell the target's assets, and divide the target's remaining assets among
themselves without informing the target of the acquisitions. 113 CONG. REC. 854, 857-58 (1967)
(remarks of Sen. Kuchel). The Williams Act effectively limits the amount of shares that
a prospective bidder may acquire without disclosing the bidder's previous acquisitions. See
15 U.S.C. SS 78m(d), 78n(d) (1976) (S 13(d) and S 14(d) of '34 Act require disclosure of beneficial
ownership of at least 5% of equity securities of corporation). Under the original version
of the Williams Act, Congress drafted § 13(d) and S 14(d) to trigger disclosure requirements
upon an individuals acquisition of 10% or more of the equity securities of a company. Williams
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (amending 15 U.S.C. SS 78m-n (1964)) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d-(e), 78n(d}-(f) (1976)). In 1970, however, Congress amended the Williams
Act to mandate disclosure of a 5/o equity interest in a corporation's stock to provide public
disclosure of impending corporate takeovers at a more meaningful level. H.R. REP. No. 1655,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5025, 5026-27.
15 U.S.C. S 78n(e) (1976).
"See id.; infra text accompanying note 17 (conduct prohibited under S 14(d) of '34 Act).
16 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) of the '34 Act prohibits any person from employ-
ing manipulative devices in connection with the sale or purchase of securities. Id. ('34 Act,
S 10(b)). Pursuant to the rulemaking authority granted in S 10(b), the SEC promulgated
rule 10b-5 to define certain practices that violate S 10(b). See 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1982).
Rule 10b-5 prohibits any person from employing any device to defraud investors, making
any untrue statement, failing to state a material fact, or engaging in any act that operates
as fraud. Id. Although the '34 Act does not provide expressly for a private right of action
under S 10(b) and rule 10b-5, courts have implied limited private rights of action under
the rule. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980) (duty to disclose
under rule 10b-5 arises only when privity exists between buyer and seller of securities);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (plaintiff must prove defendant acted
with scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (plaintiff
actually must have purchased or sold securities to have standing to sue under rule 10b-5);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972) (plaintiff must show
that defendant made misrepresentation or failed to state material fact); Titan Group, Inc.
v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975) (plaintiff must prove that defendant's conduct
caused plaintiff actual economic loss), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir. 1974) (plaintiff must prove reliance
on defendant's misrepresentation).
" 15 U.S.C. S 78n(e) (1976). The language of S 14(e) parallels the language of rule 10b-5.
See supra note 16 (rule 10b-5). Compare 15 U.S.C. S 78n(e) (1976) with 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5
(1982) (similarity in language of S 14(e) of '34 Act and rule 10b-5). Although courts have
required a plaintiff to show that he was an actual purchaser or seller of a security to main-
[Vol. 40:1199
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transaction constituted a tender offer and that the transaction was a
manipulative device designed to further the success of the tender offer.18
Although section 14(e) attempts to prohibit any fraudulent conduct with
respect to tender offers, section 14(e) does not define either the term
"tender offer" or "manipulation."'9 As a result of congressional failure to
define essential terms of section 14(e), courts have had difficulty effec-
tively applying section 14(e) to various takeover transactions.20 Courts
generally have decided specific section 14(e) claims on a case-by-case basis.21
Judicial struggles in applying essential section 14(e) concepts demonstrate
the need for affirmative statutory or administrative definitions."
One frequently recurring issue in section 14(e) cases is whether pre-
tender offer open market purchases constitute a tender offer within the
scope of the Williams Act.' In a 1982 Ninth Circuit case, Polinsky v. MCA,
tain a rule 1Ob-5 suit, S 14(e) of the '34 Act merely requires that an alleged manipulaltive
practice occur in connection with a tender offer. See 15 U.S.C. S 78n(e) (1976); supra note
16 (requirements for maintaining private right of action under rule 10b-5). One court has
noted that § 14(e)'s major contribution to the '34 Act was in expanding an individual's stand-
ing to sue. See H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1973); see
also DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 167 (standing to sue under S 10(b) and S 14(e) of '34 Act).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (prohibiting manipulative conduct in connection with
tender offers).
" See id.; see also Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th Cir.) (neither
Congress nor SEC has defined "tender offer" for purposes of Williams Act), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974).
See infra text accompanying notes 37-48, 88-101, 123-37 (various judicial construc-
tions of terms "tender offer" and "manipulation" and applications of terms to S 14(e) of '34 Act).
21 See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 1981) (courts have
recognized that meaning of "manipulation" must remain flexible in light of new techniques
that artificially affect securities markets); Barash, Corporate Takeovers and Freezouts Tender
Offers, 6 DEL. CORP. L.J. 574, 575 (1981) (SEC has chosen to define "tender offer" on case-by-
case basis).
2 See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 13, at 69-76 (uncertainty in judicial applications
of § 14(d) and 5 14(e) of '34 Act because of lack of tender offer definition); DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 7, at 147 (uncertainty in applying S 14(e) because of lack of definition of tender
offer manipulation); Griffin & Tucker, The Williamns Act, Public Law 90-439-Growing Pains?
Some Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How. L.J. 654, 699-703 (1971) (uncer-
tainty in judicial applications of 5 14(d) and S 14(e) because Williams Act does not define
tender offer); see also R. Ferarra & W. Phillips, LEGAL TIMES WASH., May 3,1982, at 17, col.
2 (courts' ineffective applications of § 14(e) to manipulative conduct in absence of satisfac-
tory definition of tender offer manipulation may pressure SEC into promulgating manipulation
definition). See generally Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1984, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1250 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Developing Meaning]
(shortcomings of courts' applications of conventional tender offer concepts under Williams
Act); Note, What is a Tender Offer?, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 908 (1980) (cases representing
courts' inconsistent applications of Williams Act to tender offer transactions).
1 See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 11-20 (open market purchases should not constitute
tender offer triggering § 14(d) disclosure requirements unless purchaser pressures
shareholders to make uninformed investment decisions). The underlying purpose of the
Williams Act is to protect investors by requiring bidders to disclose substantial acquisi-
tions of a target company's shares that may result in changes in corporate control. See
ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 13, at 75; see also 15 U.S.C. S 78m(d) (1976) (§ 13(d) of '34 Act
12031983]
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Inc.,2 4 the MCA Corporation (MCA) purchased securities of the Coca Cola
Bottling Company of Los Angeles (CCLA) on the open market." MCA
purchased CCLA securities through a stockbroker who opened a numbered
account for MCA with Bear, Stearns and Company without disclosing
MCA's identity to Bear, Stearns." Bear, Stearns purchased two series
requires purchaser to disclose acquisitions of company's stock that result in purchaser's
ownership of 5% or more of company's securities); id. § 78n(d) (5 14(d) of '34 Act requires
bidder to disclose prospective tender offer acquisitions that will give bidder 5% or more
beneficial ownership in target company's stock). Since Congress passed the Williams Act
to regulate corporate takeover activity, one commentator has argued that the Williams
Act should refer to all offers to purchase securities that have the capacity to pressure
shareholders into making uninformed, hasty decisions to sell. See Developing Meaning, supra
note 22, at 1270. Some litigants have argued that courts should integrate pre-tender offer
purchases with subsequent bids as part of a "creeping tender offer." See DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 7, at 17 (creeping tender offer theory and rule of integration). Proponents of
the creeping tender offer theory assert that courts should consider pre-tender offer pur-
chases as part of a subsequent formal bid for purposes of applying § 14(d) and S 14(e). See
id. One rationale for the creeping tender offer theory is that pre-tender offer purchases
deprive a seller of the opportunity to obtain a premium security price upon a subsequent
formal bid. See id. Since a bidder normally offers to buy a target company's securities at
a price above the market price of the target's securities, a bidder who purchases a target's
securities before announcing a formal bid, can obtain a target's shares at the market price
rather than the presumably higher bid price. See id. Because a bidder effectively may preclude
target shareholders from receiving a higher bid price for their shares, proponents of the
creeping tender offer theory assert that prospective bidders should disclose pre-tender of-
fer open market purchases, in compliance with S 14(d), to alert target shareholders of an
impending takeover attempt. See id.; 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d) (1976) (§ 14(d) of '34 Act requires
bidders to disclose tender offer transactions that result in bidder's ownership of 5% or
more of target securities).
Although the creeping tender offer theory parallels congressional intent to require
disclosure of large-scale stock purchases, most courts have rejected the creeping tender
offer argument. See generally Note, Developments in Corporate Takeover Techniques: Creep-
ing Tender Offers, Lockup Arrangements, and Standstill Agreements, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1095 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Takeover Techniques]. Most courts have rejected
the creeping tender offer theory by reasoning that § 13(d) disclosure requirements afford
prospective target companies sufficient protection to alert the target of potential takeover
attempts. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 597-99 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(open market purchases of 4.4% of target's securities did not trigger S 13(d) or § 14(d)
disclosure requirements and did not constitute tender offer); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev.
Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 404 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (undisclosed purchases of 2.2% of target stock
despite conscious avoidance of 5% disclosure triggering requirement did not violate Williams
Act); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066,
1074 (S.D.N.Y.) (5% purchase limitation under S 13(d) permits bidder to purchase up to 5%
of target securities on open market regardless of subsequent bid), af]fd on other grounds,
476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
24 680 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1288.
Id. MCA Inc. (MCA) indirectly purchased shares of the Coca Cola Bottling Co. of
Los Angeles (CCLA) through Bear, Stearns and Co. (Bear, Stearns). Id. MCA's stockbroker
opened a numbered account with Bear, Stearns for MCA but did not disclose MCA's identity
to Bear, Stearns. Id. After Bear, Stearns opened the numbered account for MCA, Bear,
Stearns purchased CCLA securities from Goldman, Sachs and Co. (Goldman, Sachs). Id.
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of CCLA securities from Goldman, Sachs and Company, including issues
of common stock and preferred shares and resold the securities to MCA
on the numbered account.' MCA subsequently announced a formal tender
offer for CCLA.28 While MCA's offer remained in effect, Northwest In-
dustries, Inc. announced a competing tender offer.' MCA did not outbid
the competing offer and subsequently tendered its CCLA stock to
Northwest. 0 The original sellers of CCLA stock filed suit against MCA
alleging that MCA had violated section 10(b) of the '34 Act because MCA
had a duty to disclose its intention to make a tender offer for CCLA prior
to purchasing CCLA securities on the open market.- Additionally, the
plaintiffs alleged that MCA's open market purchases and subsequent bid
to acquire control of CCLA constituted a manipulative tender offer scheme
in violation of section 14(e).2 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of California denied MCA's motion for summary judg-
ment and MCA appealed to the Ninth Circuit.'
The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that section 10(b)
required MCA to disclose its intention to make a tender offer for CCLA4.
3
Initially, the Ninth Circuit noted that a duty to disclose under section
10(b) arises only when a relationship exists between a seller and buyer.
3 5
Goldman, Sachs sold Bear, Stearns CCLA securities that CCLA shareholders previously
had sold Goldman, Sachs. Id Consequently, MCA purchased CCLA securities without deal-
ing directly with either CCLA shareholders or Goldman, Sachs. Id.
27 Id. After Bear, Stearns purchased common shares of CCLA from Goldman, Sachs
on MCA's numbered account, Goldman, Sachs initiated an offer to sell Bear, Stearns CCLA
convertible preferred securities and additional CCLA common stock. Id. Bear, Stearns pur-
chased the two securities issues and resold the shares to MCA on the numbered account.
Id. Goldman, Sachs thereafter initiated another offer to sell Bear, Stearns additional shares
of CCLA common stock and convertible preferred shares. Id. Goldman, Sachs had acquired
all CCLA shares sold to Bear, Stearns from the plaintiff shareholders of CCLA. Id.
' Id. After acquiring CCLA securities on the open market for a period of two months,
MCA announced a tender offer for CCLA in which MCA agreed to pay $30 per share for
CCLA common stock and $58.50 per share for CCLA convertible preferred stock. Id.
" Id. Northwest Industries announced a tender offer for CCLA offering to pay $40
per share for COLA common stock and $78 per share for CCLA convertible preferred shares.
Id. MCA stated that it did not know Northwest would make a bid for CCLA until North-
west actually announced the tender offer for CCLA. Id.
0 Id.
3 Id. at 1288-90; see 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976) (S 10(b) of '34 Act); supra note 16 (S 10(b)
of '34 Act and rule 10b-5).
680 F.2d at 1288, 1290-91; see 15 U.S.C. S 78n(e) (1976).
See 680 F.2d at 1286-88. The United States District Court for the Southern District
of California denied defendant MCA's motion for summary judgment in CCLA's shareholder
suit against MCA but permitted MCA to appeal the order by certifying the case to the.
Ninth Circuit. See id. at 1288; see also 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) (1976) (permitting district judge
to allow immediate appeal from district court orders that involve controlling questions of
law when immediate appeal materially may advance ultimate termination of litigation).
680 F.2d at 1289-90.
Id. at 1289. In considering whether MCA had a duty to disclose its intention of mak-
ing a bid for CCLA before purchasing CCLA securities, the Polinsky court cited a Supreme
1983] 1205
1206 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Since no privity existed between MCA and the plaintiffs, the Polinsky
court determined that MCA had no duty to disclose under section 10(b).1
6
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that MCA's open
market purchases and subsequent bid constituted a manipulative tender
offer scheme in violation of section 14(e).37 The plaintiffs contended that
although section 14(e) of the Williams Act does not proscribe specifically
manipulative conduct in connection with the mere purchase or sale of
securities not amounting to a tender offer, section 14(e) nevertheless pro-
hibited MCA's open market purchases because MCA's open market pur-
chasing program was actually part of MCA's subsequent bid to acquire
Court decision that addressed a purchaser's duty to disclose under S 10(b). See id. In Chiarella
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that silence in connection with a purchase or
sale of securities constitutes actionable fraud under S 10(b) when parties to a purchase or
sale owe a duty of disclosure to one another. 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). The Chiarella Court
concluded that privity must exist between a purchaser and seller of securities before either
party must disclose nonpublic market information to the other party. See id. at 235; see
also General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus. Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968) (tender of-
feror's preannouncement silence does not violate rule 10b-5 when no privity exists between
offeror and seller), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
" See 680 F.2d at 1289; supra note 35 (tender offerors have no duty to disclose non-
public market information under S 10 (b) and rule 10b-5 when no privity exists between
offeror and seller). In addition to determining that MCA had no duty to disclose its inten-
tion of making a tender offer for CCLA, the Ninth Circuit noted that the securities laws
do not require a potential bidder to disclose its bidding strategy before purchasing less
than 50 of a target company's securities. 680 F.2d at 1289-90; see supra note 2 (filing
requirements under Williams Act). Since MCA apparently purchased less than 5% of CCLA's
equity securities, the Polinsky court determined that S 13(d) and S 14(d) of the '34 Act did
not require MCA to disclose its bidding strategy or its hopes for a higher "white knight
offer." See 680 F.2d at 1289-90. A target company often locates a friendly corporation or
"white knight" to make a bid at a price higher than a previous unfriendly bid. See id. at
1290 n.4. A target company seeks a white knight who is friendly to target management
to protect a target company's present management. See id. The Polinsky decision implies
that bidders may submit bids for target companies, upon obtaining blocks of a target's
stock at market price, with the full intention of being outbid by a target's white knight.
See id. at 1290. By noting that a purchaser of less than 5% of a company's securities does
not have to disclose his intention to sell target shares to a white knight offeror, the Polin-
sky court effectively approved open market purchasing programs designed to achieve a
financial gain rather than to ensure the success of a purchaser's subsequent bid. See id.
After determining that MCA did not have to disclose its bidding strategy, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' allegation that MCA purchased CCLA shares with the intent
to manipulate the market by making a "low ball tender offer." Id. The purpose of a low
ball tender offer is to bid for a target at a low price to ensure that the bidder acquires
control of the target at a bargain price. See id. at 1290 n.3. The Polinsky court determined
that MCA's low ball tender offer was not a manipulative device under rule 10b-5. Id. at
1290; see 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1982). The Polinsk court determined that the alleged low
ball tender offer scheme did not harm the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs' alleged injury
arose from MCA's pre-tender offer open market purchases rather than from MCA's tender
offer. 680 F.2d at 1290. The Ninth Circuit accordingly reasoned that the alleged low ball
tender offer was not manipulative. Id.
680 F.2d at 1290-91.
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control of CCLA.3 8 In effect, the plaintiffs argued that the court should
integrate 9 MCA's pre-tender offer purchases with MCA's subsequent bid
to determine whether MCA's tender offer scheme was manipulative under
section 14(e).10
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' integration argument by
simply concluding that MCA's open market purchases did not constitute
a tender offer under section 14(e).41 The Polinsky court initially noted that
since neither Congress nor the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
had defined "tender offer," the applicable standard for determining
whether MCA's open market purchases constituted a tender offer was
the test established by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in Wellman v. Dickinson.42 In Wellman, the court
cited several factors that the SEC has adopted as characteristics of tender
offers.43 The Polinsky court applied each Wellman characteristic to MCA's
- See id. at 1290. Compare 15 U.S.C. S 78n(e) (1976) with id. S 78j(b) (S 14(e) of '34 Act
.prohibits manipulative conduct in connection with tender offers while S 10(b) prohibits
manipulative conduct in connection with purchase or sale of securities).
11 See supra note 23 (court should integrate pre-tender offer open market purchases
with subsequent bids to determine whether bidder complied with 5 14(d) disclosure
requirements). The plaintiffs in Polinsky did not ask the court explicitly to integrate MCA's
pre-tender offer purchases and subsequent bid, but did argue that MCA's open market pur-
chasing program, in connection with MCA's subsequent bid, constituted a manipulative tender
offer scheme in violation of S 14(e). See 680 F2d at 1291.
, See id. at 1290-91.
" Id. at 1291.
"2 Id. at 1290-91; see Welman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 682
F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982).
43See 475 F. Supp. at 823-24. The SEC has suggested several characteristics that in-
dicate a particular transaction constitutes a tender offer. See id. The SEC tender offer
characteristics include widespread solicitation of shareholders for a substantial percentage
of an issuer's securities, an offer to purchase securities at a premium price on terms that
are nonnegotiable, an offer to purchase shares that is contingent on the bidder's receipt
of a requisite number of shares within a specific time period, and exertion of pressure on
shareholders to sell. Id. The SEC tender offer characteristics reflect the SEC's determina-
tion that certain open market purchases, accompanied by widespread and active solicita-
tion of target shareholders, exert pressure on shareholders to make uninformed invest-
ment decisions in the absence of prepurchase disclosure requirements. See also S-G Sec.,
Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1125-27 (D. Mass. 1978) (offeror's public announce-
ment of intent to acquire target company and subsequent rapid accumulation of target stock
encouraged hasty investment decisions that Williams Act attempts to prevent); Cattlemen's
Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (active and widespread solicita-
tion of target shareholders by telephone conversations, personal visits, and mail constituted
tender offer because solicitor's methods pressured shareholders into making ill-considered
investment decisions), vacated per stipulation, Civil No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972).
In Wellman, a bidder solicited target shareholders by telephone and subsequently purchased
34% of the target's shares. 475 F. Supp. at 809-10. The Wellman court cited the SEC's
formulation of tender offer characteristics and determined that the solicitor's transactions
constituted a tender offer. Id. at 822. Emphasizing the tender offer characteristics of the
transaction in Wellman, the Wellman court found that the solicitor's takeover acquisition
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purchases and concluded that MCA's pre-tender offer purchases did not
constitute a tender offer within the scope of section 14(e).44 For example,
the court noted that MCA did not announce publicly its desire to pur-
chase CCLA shares, nor did MCA directly solicit any CCLA shareholder.45
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit stated that MCA paid a fair market price
for CCLA shares and that MCA did not condition its offer to buy CCLA
shares on the tender of a certain number of CCLA shares. 6 The court
noted that MCA had not pressured CCLA shareholders into selling because
the shareholders voluntarily had sold their CCLA shares to their broker,
Goldman, Sachs. 4' Since the Polinsky court found that MCA's purchases
did not constitute a tender offer, the court did not decide whether the
purchases were part of a manipulative tender offer scheme. 8
The effect of the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Polinsky is to permit tender
offer practices that are violative of the Williams Act in substance but
not in form. 9 The Polinsky decision, however, reflects a majority rule by
refusing either to classify open market purchases as tender offers, or to
integrate open market purchases with subsequent tender offers, for the
purpose of determining whether section 14(d0 tender offer disclosure re-
quirements apply." In some cases, however, courts have found that the
program, premium offering price, and conditional obligation to purchase target securities
constituted a tender offer, although the solicitor had not pursued a course of active and
widespread solicitation. Id. at 822-24.




41 See id. at 1290-91.
11 See supra note 23 (open market purchases preceding formal bids may exert pressure
on shareholder to make hasty investment decisions and may constitute integral part of
bidder's takeover strategy); infra note 51 (courts' definitions of tender offers and refusals
to classify open market purchases as tender offers).
15 U.S.C. S 78n(d) (1976).
5, See, e.g., Brascan, Ltd. v. Edper Equities, Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 789-90 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (acquisition of large blocks of stock on open market through cautious bidding is not
tender offer regardless of amount of stock accumulation); Financial General Bankshares,
Inc. v. Lance [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,403, at 93,429 (D.D.C. 1978)
(open market transactions without widespread publicity do not constitute tender offer); D-
Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,771, at 96,562
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (tender offer does not include every offer to purchase securities that may
pressure shareholders into making uninformed investment decisions, Nachman Corp. v.
Halfred, Inc. [1973.1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,592 (N.D.
Ill. 1973) (same); Water & Wall Assoc. v. American Consumer Indus., [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,943, at 93,759 (D.N.J. 1973) (purchasing shares on open market
to acquire control of corporation does not constitute tender offer although open market
actions may affect stock's price). But see In re Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [Cur-
rent] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,310, at 85,695 (SEC Dec. 30,1982) (brokerage firm engaged
in unconventional tender offer by purchasing 9.9% of company's stock at nonnegotiable
premium price pursuant to conditional offer).
Generally, courts refusing to integrate pre-tender offer open market purchases with
subsequent bids determine whether a particular purchaser has complied with S 13(d) disclosure
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Williams Act requires a bidder who has publicized his intent to make a
tender offer for a target to comply with section 14(d) upon purchasing
target securities prior to a formal bid.2
requirements but do not consider whether the open market purchases triggered 5 14(d)
tender offer disclosure requirements. Compare 15 U.S.C. S 78m(d) (1976) with id. S 78n(d)
(§ 13(d) requires purchaser to disclose certain information to SEC within 10 days of pur-
chases while S 14(d) requires bidder to disclose certain information to SEC upon initiating
tender offer transaction). Courts consistently have refused to integrate pre-tender offer
open market purchases with subsequent bids to require bidders to disclose bidding strategies
pursuant to S 14(d) in situations in which S 13(d) would not require disclosure. See generally
J. Maiwurm & J. Tobin, Beachhead Acquisitions: Creating Waves in the Marketplace and
Uncertainty in the Regulatory Framework, 38 Bus. LAw. 419 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Beachhead Acquisitions] (case law under § 14(d) does not justify concern on part of accumulator
of pre-tender offer target stock that courts will treat accumulation process as tender offer).
If an individual purchases less than 50/0 of a company's equity securities, the purchaser
does not have to disclose his purchases under § 13(d). See 15 U.S.C. S 78m(d) (1976). Never-
theless, many litigants have argued that prospective bidders must disclose their pre-tender
offer open market purchases under 5 14(d) if the bidder's open market purchases and subse-
quent bid will result in the bidder's ownership of 5% or more of a target's equity securities.
See 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZOUTS § 2.3, at 113-26 (1978) (courts decide
whether tender offer commenced when offeror made open market purchases before deter-
mining whether offeror complied with disclosure requirements under either § 13(d) or 5
14(d)). Courts generally have held that open market purchases, standing alone, do not trig-
ger the disclosure requirements of S 14(d). See, e.g., Calumet Indus., Inc. v. MacClure, [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,434, at 93,567 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (minimal open
market purchases did not trigger disclosure requirements under 5 14(d)); Copperweld Corp.
v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 598 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (indirect acquisition of 4.4 0 of target com-
pany shares by open market purchases preceding tender offer did not trigger S 14(d)); cf.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978) (even
though purchaser of less than 5% of target stock intends to make subsequent tender offer,
he does not have to disclose purchases under S 13(d) because disclosure requirement would
render § 13(d) meaningless except in cases in which purchaser does not intend to take con-
trolling interest); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 356 F.
Supp. 1066, 1073-74 (S.D.N.Y.) (although prospective bidder had formed intent to bid for
target prior to purchasing target shares on open market, bidder did not have to disclose
limited purchases under S 13(d)), affid on other grounds, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); see also
Corporate Takeover Techniques, supra note 23, at 1102 (determining whether bidder's open
market purchases trigger S 14(d) disclosure requirements).
m See, e.g., S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126 (D. Mass. 1978)
(publicity of proposed tender offer exerts pressure on shareholders that Williams Act
disclosure provisions seek to prevent); Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425
F. Supp. 1145, 1151, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (when offeror announces intent to bid for target,
courts should apply Williams Act to protect shareholders from dangers Congress intended
to prevent).
Although Congress did not define tender offer under the Williams Act, the legislative
history distinguishes between tender offers and open market purchases. See H.R. REP. No.
1711, supra note 2, at 2812 (describing characteristics of conventional tender offers); 113
CONG. REC. 856 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 13, at 74
(Williams Act distinguishes between tender offers and other types of acquisitions including
open market purchases and privately negotiated transactions); Developing Meaning, supra
note 22, at 1261 (congressional focus on conventional bids indicates Congress may have
intended § 13(d) to cover all transactions except conventional bids). Furthermore, the SEC
apparently acknowledged the difference between tender offers and open market purchases
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Arguably, a judicial decision to regulate all open market purchases
as tender offers effectively would preclude all methods of stock acquisi-
tion other than tender offers.0 Yet some open market purchases exert
the same uninformed investment decision pressures on shareholders that
a conventional tender offer exerts., Like the plaintiffs in Polinsky, many
in rule 10b-13, promulgated pursuant to S 10(b) of the '34 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976);
17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-13 (1982). Rule 10b-13 prohibits an offeror from purchasing a target's
securities during the course of an offer but is silent on the issue of pre-tender offer pur-
chases. See id. Although rule 10b-13 does not address pre-tender offer purchases, S 13(d)
of the '34 Act regulates open market purchases by requiring purchasers to disclose acquisi-
tions of a company's securities that exceed 5% of the company's equity securities. See id.
S 240.13d-1. Apparently, courts have determined that S 13(d) provides shareholders with
adequate protection in situations in which a prospective bidder has made substantial open
market purchases of target stock because S 13(d), like 5 14(d), requires purchasers of greater
than 5% of a target's stock to disclose the purchaser's control intent. See Beachhead
Acquisitions, supra note 51, at 445-52 (target relief under 5 13(d) when pre-tender offer stock
accumulator inadequately discloses control intent). Since Congress chose to regulate both
open market purchases and tender offers, courts correctly have resisted integrating pre-
tender offer open market purchases with subsequent bids to require open market purchasers
to comply with § 14(d) notwithstanding the amount of open market purchases. See infra
text accompanying note 53. Although Congress and the SEC have acknowledged the distinc-
tion between tender offers and other forms of stock acquisition, courts should not apply
uniformly S 13(d) to all open market purchasing programs and S 14(d) to all conventional
tender offers because certain aggressive open market purchasing programs may constitute
an integral part of particular tender offer transactions and may pressure shareholders to
make uninformed investment decisions. See infra text accompanying note 54. Courts should
decide William Act issues on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a particular open
market purchasing program constituted a tender offer in substance by pressuring
shareholders to make uninformed decisions to sell. See S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co.,
466 F. Supp. 1114, 1124 (D. Mass. 1978) (rapid acquisition of large blocks of stock through
open market purchases accompanied by publicly announced intent to acquire substantial
block constituted tender offer within scope of S 14(d)); supra text accompanying notes 41-48
(Radol court's determination that MCA's open market purchases of CCLA stock did not
pressure CCLA shareholders into tendering their shares).
" See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 13, at 75. In addressing whether courts should
regulate open market purchases as tender offers, commentators have noted that tender
offer regulation would preclude open market trading because sellers and purchasers could
not comply with other provisions of the Williams Act regulating withdrawal, proration,
and price. Id. The provisions of § 14(d) regulating tender offer withdrawal, proration, and
price effectively extend the relationship between an offeror and seller for the period of
an effective bid to permit either party to vary the terms of their original transaction. See
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976) (shareholder may withdraw tendered shares from depositary
within seven days of bid); id. S 78(n)(d)(7) (when offeror increases consideration, offeror must
pay all tendering shareholders "best price" of offer); id. § 78n(d)(6) (offeror must take shares
tendered within 10 days of bid on pro rata basis). But see SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 34-19336 (Dec. 15, 1982), reprinted in [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 83,306,
at 85,650 (offeror must take tendered shares on pro rata basis for effective period of bid).
In an open market transaction, however, the relationship between a buyer and seller ter-
minates when the shareholder sells his securities and, therefore, provisions under S 14(d)
that extend the buyer-seller relationship necessarily cannot apply. See ARANOW & EINHORN,
supra note 13, at 75 (impossibility of purchasing securities on open market and complying
with §§ 14(d)(5)-(7)).
See Developing Meaning, supra note 22, at 1270.
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litigants have urged courts to integrate pre-tender offer purchases with
subsequent bids to trigger substantive provisions of the Williams Act. 
5
Proponents of the rule of integration argue that pre-tender offer open
market purchases deprive a seller of the opportunity to receive a premium
price for the seller's securities while permitting the offeror to pay only
the market price for the shares.' Accordingly, integration proponents con-
tend that section 14(d) should require prospective bidders to disclose their
bidding strategy before purchasing a target's securities to enable
shareholders to make informed investment decisions whether to sell their
securities at a market price or to hold out for a presumably higher bid
price.57
As a result of the courts' reluctance to expand the definition of tender
offers, the SEC has proposed a two-tier tender offer test that focuses on
four factors pertaining to the bidder's method of acquisition and the nature
of the bid itself.58 Specifically, the SEC test would examine a prospective
bidder's solicitation of offerees, the dissemination of offers to purchase,
the negotiability of those offers, and the actual purchase price.59 Under
the first tier of the SEC test, at least one offer to purchase a company's
securities of the same class within a forty-five day period constitutes a
tender offer if the solicitor directs the offer to more than ten people, and
if the solicitor seeks more than five percent of the company's securities.5
A prospective bidder may avoid the first tier of the SEC tender offer
test by acquiring less than five percent of a company's securities through
open market purchases." Under the second tier, however, even those trans-
actions not resulting in the purchaser's ownership of five percent of a
company's securities may constitute tender offers if the offeror widely
disseminates a nonnegotiable offer that represents a premium of the
greater of two dollars or five percent above market price.6 In other words,
the SEC has determined that widely disseminated open market purchas-
ing programs that establish a nonnegotiable premium offer trigger sec-
tion 14(d)'s tender offer disclosure requirements, notwithstanding the
amount of stock solicited by the offeror. 3 Although courts consistently
"See supra note 23 and text accompanying notes 3740 (integration and creeping tender
offers).
"See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 17.
'7 See id.
' See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16385 (Nov. 29, 1979), reprinted
in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,374, at 82,600 (proposed rule 14d-l(b)).
The SEC proposed tender offer definition died at the end of the congressional term, but
the SEC presently has not suggested an alternative definition. See Beachhead Acquisitions,
supra note 51, at 463 n.244.
" See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16385 (Nov. 29, 1979), reprinted




' See id. Before proposing the two-tier definition of tender offers, the SEC previously
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have determined that limited open market purchases do not constitute
tender offers and do not trigger section 14(d) disclosure requirements,
the second tier of the proposed tender offer test specifically would re-
quire courts to disregard the amount of open market purchases and would
enable courts to consider the tender offer characteristics of open market
purchasing programs.4
Although the proposed SEC tender offer test would assist courts in
applying substantive provisions of the Williams Act, courts will continue
to lack statutory or administrative guidelines in determining whether a
particular practice pertaining to a tender offer is manipulative conduct
in violation of section 14(e). To determine whether a particular tender
offer practice is manipulative conduct in violation of section 14(e), courts
currently rely on the Supreme Court's definition of manipulation announced
in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green." In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court
defined "manipulation" under section 10(b) of the '34 Act as a securities
market term of art referring to practices intended to affect market activ-
ity artificially. 7 Even though the Supreme Court's definition of manipula-
tion apparently applies to any intentional practice which artificially af-
fects market activity, the Court limited the applicability of the definition
to conduct relating generally to the purchase and sale of securities by
listing specific examples of manipulative practices." Under the Santa Fe
had proposed regulating all pre-tender offer open market purchases in situations in which
a bidder had decided to make a bid for a target company. See SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 34-15548 (Feb. 5, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 81,935, at 81,237-41 (proposed rule 14e-2(c)). Unlike the proposed two-tier defini-
tion of tender offers, proposed rule 14e-2(c) always requires a bidder who intends to make
bid for a target company to disclose his bidding strategy before purchasing a target's
securities on the open market. See id. (requiring bidder to annouce publicly his identity,
target's identity, bidding price, and number of shares he will solicit). By proposing the cur-
rent definition of tender offer, the SEC apparently has determined that shareholders need
to know all relevant facts concerning widely disseminated, open market purchasing pro-
grams but do not need to know necessarily facts concerning potential bidding stragegies
that do not employ widespread solicitation of shareholdes. Compare id. (proposed rule 14e-2(c))
with SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16385 (Nov. 29,1979), reprinted in [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (OCH) 82,374, at 82,600 (proposed tender offer definition).
6 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16385 (Nov. 29, 1979), reprinted
in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,374, at 82,605 (second tier of SEC
proposed tender offer definition does not establish that certain amount of open market
purchases will trigger S 14(d) disclosure but does require disclosure under S 14(d) if individual
widely disseminates offers that represent nonnegotiable premium price).
I See supra note 22 and accompanying text (courts' difficulties in determining whether
particular practice is manipulative).
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
6 See id. at 476; 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976).
" See 430 U.S. at 476. In Santa Fe, minority shareholders alleged that a majority
shareholder breached his fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by accomplishing a
statutory merger that eliminated the minority's interests. See 430 U.S. at 467. The Supreme
Court found that the majority shareholder's action was not manipulative under S 10(b) because
manipulation refers to conduct designed to affect artificially market activity and does not
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definition of manipulation, manipulative practices include wash sales,69 mat-
ched orders,"0 and rigged prices 1 that artificially affect market activity. 2
Although the SantaFe Court's definition of manipulation applied specific-
ally to section 10(b) cases, courts also apply the Santa Fe definition of
manipulation to tender offer issues under section 14(e).13 The Santa Fe
definition of manipulation, however, has frustrated many litigants alleg-
ing section 14(e) violations, because the Court's definition focuses on ar-
tificial market activity resulting from the purchase and sale of securities
without encompassing conceivable tender offer conduct that adversely may
affect shareholders' interests.'4
For example, in Radol v. Thomas,5 several shareholders of Marathon
Oil Company brought suit to enjoin a proposed merger between United
States Steel, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the United States Steel
Corporation, and Marathon on the ground that the merger was a
manipulative device prohibited by section 14(e) of the '34 Act.7 6 The con-
refer to breaches of fiduciary duties absent an allegation of deception. See id. at 476. In
referring to manipulation as a securities market term of art, the Santa Fe Court cited specific
examples of practices designed to affect market activity artificially and to mislead investors
by artificially raising or depressing securities prices. See id.
' See 15 U.S.C. S 78i(a)(1)(A)(1976). Wash sales create a false or misleading appearance
of active trading because a wash sale is a securities transaction that gives the appearance
of being a purchase or sale but does not involve an actual change of beneficial ownership.
See id.; accord FED. SEC. CODE § 1609(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
7 See 15 U.S.C. 5 78i(aX1)(B)(C)(1976). A matched order is a buy or sell order initiated
by an individual with knowledge that another person has entered, or intends to enter, an
offsetting buy or sell order. See id. Matched orders, like wash sales, create a falsg or
misleading appearance of active trading with respect to a market for a security. See FED.
SEC. CODE § 1609(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
7 See R.J. Koeppe & Co. v. SEC, 95 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1938). Price rigging in-
volves a series of pretended purchases that inflate a security's price and that are intended
to create an unusual demand for the security. See id. Section 9(a)(2) of the '34 Act prohibits
any individual from accomplishing a series of transactions designed to induce the purchase
or sale of securities by raising or depressing a security's price through actual or apparent
trading. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2)(1976).
I See 430 U.S. at 476. The Santa Fe definition of securities manipulation, representing
a conventional free market concept in securities transactions, recognizes that outside in-
vestors necessarily rely on stock exchange price quotations as representing the true value
of a security. See 430 U.S. at 476. See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1536 (2d
ed. 1961). When an outsider reads a stock's price quotations, he supposes that the price
quotations represent a series of actual sales between various purchasers and sellers deal-
ing at arms length in a free and open securities market and do not reflect sham trading
transactions designed to affect artificially the security's real value. See id. at 1536-37, (citing
United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), affd, 79 F.2d 321, 323 (2d Cir.
1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650 (1935)).
" See infra text accompanying notes 102 & 103, 135-37 (courts' determinations of
manipulation issues under S 14(e) on the basis of Santa Fe definition of manipulation).
T' See infra text accompanying notes 104-07, 135-42 (Santa Fe definition of manipula-
tion does not prevent offerors from adversely affecting shareholders' investments).
534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
7 Id. at 1304. The Mobil Corporation and United States Steel Corporation both
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troversy surrounding the proposed Marathon takeover began when the
Mobil Corporation announced a tender offer for forty million shares of
Marathon at eighty-five dollars per share.77 Marathon decided to resist
Mobil's takeover attempt and to locate a white knight." After several
discussions, United States Steel and Marathon signed a merger agree-
ment involving two steps. First, United States Steel announced a tender
offer for Marathon, proposing to pay one hundred and twenty-five dollars
per share in cash for thirty million outstanding shares of Marathon. Sec-
ond, United States Steel proposed a subsequent merger between United
States Steel and Marathon in which United States Steel would exchange
debt securities for the remaining outstanding shares of Marathon.' The
approximate value of United States Steel's debt securities was eighty-six
dollars per share at the time of the merger agreement."1 In response to
United States Steel's bid, Marathon shareholders tendered ninety-one per-
cent of Marathon's outstanding common stock for one hundred and twenty-
five dollars per share.82 United States Steel thereafter voted the acquired
shares in favor of the proposed merger.' Before United States Steel ex-
changed its debt securities for the remaining outstanding shares of
Marathon, however, several shareholders sought to enjoin the merger,
alleging that the two-tier pricing structure of United States Steel's bid
and proposed merger was a manipulative device." In particular, the plain-
tiffs argued that the two-tier pricing structure created artificial market
influences by pressuring Marathon shareholders to tender their shares
to United States Steel for one hundred and twenty-five dollars per share
to avoid the risk of obtaining the lower price of eighty-six dollars per
share in the prospective second-step merger.' Because United States Steel
attempted a takeover of Marathon Oil Company. Id. at 1304-05. A derivative shareholder
action on the part of Marathon shareholders represented the last in a series of lawsuits
resulting from the Marathon takeover attempt. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669
F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981) (Mobil suit against Marathon and United States Steel contesting
validity of lockup agreement between Marathon and United States Steel pursuant to United
States Steel's white knight offer); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315 (NJ).
Ohio 1981) (Marathon antitrust suit against Mobil to avoid Mobil's takeover attempt).
534 F. Supp. at 1304.
78 Id.
' Id. at 1305. United States Steel's tender offer for Marathon's 30 million outstanding
shares represented approximately 51/o of Marathon's outstanding shares. Id.
Id. at 1305-06.




Id. at 1311. The plaintiffs in Radol alleged that United States Steel's two-tier pric-
ing structure forced shareholders to tender their shares at the first stage of United States
Steel's takeover transaction because nontendering shareholders otherwise would face the
risk of obtaining a substantially lower share price during the subsequent second-stage freeze-
out of minority nontendering shareholders. Id. Tender offers are generally the first step
of a two-step merger. See Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
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would vote the tendered shares in favor of the merger, United States
Steel could freeze-out "8 the nontendering minority shareholders in the
merger by exchanging debt securities for the remaining outstanding
Marathon shares at a price substantially below the tender offer price. 7
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
in Radol determined that United States Steel designed the two-tier pric-
ing structure to encourage Marathon shareholders to tender their shares
at the first stage of the takeover transaction.' The Radol court recognized
that tender offers are inherently coercive because shareholders must
decide whether to tender or face the risk of being frozen out by a subse-
quent merger." The Radol court noted, however, that the plaintiffs had
not shown any other case holding that a two-tier pricing structure was
a manipulative device." Furthermore, the Radol court commented that
HARv. L. REV. 1028, 1033 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Facilitating Competing Tender Offers]
(takeover techniques). At the first stage of a takeover attempt, a bidder acquires a majority
interest in a target's shares through open market purchases and a subsequent tender offer.
See Corporate Takeover Techniques, supra note 23, at 1096-97. After acquiring a majority
interest in a target company's securities, a bidder may "freeze-out" the minority shareholders
of the target by accomplishing a merger with the target. See Facilitating Competing Tender
Offers, supra at 1033. To accomplish a second-step merger, a bidder will buy out the minority
interests and will compensate the nontendering minority shareholders by exchanging cash
or securities for target stock. See id. The consideration paid to the nontendering minority
shareholders during the freeze-out normally is greater than the shares' pre-tender offer
price but less than the shares' bid price. See id.
I See infra note 87 (freeze-out often constitutes second stage of tender offer-merger
transaction).
534 F. Supp. at 1311-12. Although the plaintiffs in Radol alleged that the threat
of a second-step freeze-out following the United States Steel tender offer unlawfully coerced
Marathon shareholders to tender their shares at the first stage of United States Steel's
takeover bid, a freeze-out is a common takeover device in which a tender offeror purchases
a majority interest in.a company and subsequently eliminates the minority shareholders'
interests by paying the minority shareholders a fair price for their shares. Id.; see supra
note 85 (takeover techniques). See generally Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal and
"Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAw. 485 (1983) (state law remedies for
shareholders challenging second-step, second-tier merger price in light of higher first-tier,
tender offer price).
534 F. Supp. at 1311.
Id. at 1312. The Radol court, in assessing whether United States Steel's two-tier
pricing structure for the Marathon tender offer and subsequent merger constituted a
manipulative device, noted that tender offers are inherently coercive. Id.; accord Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969) (participants
in tender offer act under stresses of marketplace and may act impulsively in angry response
to perceived "low blows" by other side). In particular, the Radol court determined that
bids force shareholders to determine whether to sell their shares at a premium price or
to hold out and face the risk that a majority of shareholders will tender. See 534 F. Supp.
at 1312. In the event that a majority does tender to the offeror, a nontendering minority
shareholder faces the risk of a subsequent second-step merger and freeze-out. Id.; see supra
note 85 (takeover techniques). The Radol court noted that although tender offers are coer-
cive, Congress chose to regulate, rather than prohibit, tender offer takeover techniques.
534 F. Supp. at 1312.
534 F. Supp. at 1312.
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both case law9' and pertinent SEC rules92 contemplate two-tier pricing
arrangements. 3 Rule 13e-3,V for example, regulates "going private"'95 trans-
actions, including two-step tender offer-merger transactions, by requir-
ing issuers of equity securities to disclose certain information to the SEC
before the issuer may purchase the issuer's equity securities.6 Rule 13e-3
specifically excludes second-step merger transactions following a tender
offer, however, provided that a tender offeror pays nontendering minority
shareholders a price per share in a second-step merger that is equal to
the highest price per share offered in the first-step tender offer. If an
offeror pays nontendering shareholders a price in a second-step merger
transaction that is less than the highest tender offer share price, the of-
feror must comply with rule 13e-3." Since rule 13e-3 regulates rather than
prohibits two-tier pricing arrangements of second-step tender offer-merger
transactions, the Radol court determined that rule 13e-3, by negative im-
plication, sanctions second-step merger transactions in which a successful
bidder offers nontendering minority shareholders a price per share that
is lower than the highest tender offer price per share provided, however,
that the bidder first must comply with rule 13e-3's disclosure
91 See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1981). In asserting
that case law supports the validity of two-tier pricing structures, the Radol court cited
a case related to the Marathon takeover. 534 F. Supp. at 1312; see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon
Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981). In Mobil, the Sixth Circuit explicitly recognized that
nontendering Marathon shareholders faced the risk of receiving a lower price for their
shares during a second-step freeze-out than the price shareholders would have received
if they had tendered their shares pursuant to United States Steel's offer. Id. at 377. In
Mobil, Mobil challenged the validity of a lockup agreement between Marathon and United
States Steel in which Marathon agreed to sell United States Steel mineral interests if a
hostile tender offeror gained control of Marathon. See id at 367-68. The Sixth Circuit found
that the lockup agreement between Marathon and United States Steel was a manipulative
device under S 14(e) because the option, extended solely to Marathon's white knight offeror,
effectively imposed a ceiling on the price that third parties would pay for Marathon shares.
See id. at 375-76. Upon finding that the lockup agreement was manipulative, the Sixth Cir-
cuit extended the duration of United States Steel's tender offer as part of the granted
relief. Id. at 377-78; see Corporate Takeover Techniques, supra note 23, at 1109-15 (Sixth Cir-
cuit's construction of S 14(e) manipulation prohibition in Mobil). Since the Sixth Circuit
extended United States Steel's tender offer, the Radol court concluded that the Sixth Cir-
cuit effectively approved the two-tier pricing structure. See 534 F. Supp. at 1312.
See 17 C.F.R. S 240.13e-3 (1982); infra text accompanying notes 97-99 (rule 13e-3).
534 F. Supp. at 1312.
17 C.F.R. S 240.13e-3 (1982).
9' See id. Rule 13e-3 regulates "going private" transactions in which a securities issuer
purchases the issuer's securities and either reduces the record holders of the securities
to 300 persons or accomplishes a delisting of the securities on a national exchange. See
id. Rule 13e-3 proscribes manipulative practices in connection with going private transac-
tions and requires issuers to disclose certain information before initiating going private
transactions. See id § 240.13e-3(d)-(f) (disclosure requirements and manner of disclosure under
rule 13e-3); infra text accompanying notes 97 & 98 (rule 13e-3 exemptions).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1982) (regulating two-step merger transactions).




requirements."' The court concluded, therefore, that the pricing structure
was not manipulative because the plaintiffs had failed to show either that
the coerciveness of the pricing structure ensured the success of United
States Steel's offer or that United States Steel's offer discouraged com-
peting bids."' The Radol court accordingly refused to hold that two-tier
pricing arrangements are per se manipulative under sections 10(b) and
14(e) of the '34 Act.
10'
Although the Radol holding establishes that two-tier pricing ar-
rangements are not per se manipulative, courts must evaluate two-tier
pricing transactions on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the pric-
ing structure artificially affects market activity and constitutes a
manipulative device in violation of the Williams Act.' 2 In evaluating
specific two-tier pricing arrangements, courts must rely on the Santa. Fe
definition of manipulation and determine whether an individual intended
to affect market activity artificially."' Under Santa Fe, the primary in-
quiry is whether an offeror employed a particular tactic designed to create
an artificial market situation to deceive investors rather than whether
the tender offer affected the forces of supply and demand in the
marketplace. 4 The Santa Fe definition of manipulation is unsatisfactory
in the tender offer context because it does not prohibit certain types of
tender offer conduct that adversely affect the securities market.'"' For
example, the Santa Fe definition does not proscribe fully disclosed con-
duct of a tender offeror designed to inhibit competing bids."' If a tender
offeror fully discloses a bidding strategy that effectively inhibits competing
534 F. Supp. at 1312.
' Id. at 1312-13. In determining whether United States Steel's pricing structure ar-
tificially affected market activity, the Radol court found that the two-tier pricing structure
was not manipulative because Mobil subsequently outbid United States Steel. Id. at 1313.
Moreover, the court noted that Mobil's initial bid, while not coercive in price structure,
attracted 47% of Marathon shares. Id Furthermore, the Radol court reasoned that Marathon's
overwhelming response to United States Steel's tender offer reflected Marathon shareholders'
approval of United States Steel's two-tier bid price. Id.
1o1 Id. at 1312.
"' See supra note 100 and accompanying text (determining effects of two-tier pricing
structure on competitive bids).
1 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977) (manipulation is trans-
action intended to affect market activity artificially); supra notes 68-72 (defining manipula-
tion as practices that artifically inflate or depress stock prices to deceive investors with
respect to particular stock's real value).
'1 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977) (manipulation is inten-
tional conduct designed to affect market activity artificially); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26-37 (1977) (deception is necessary element of 5 14(e) manipulation claim);
see also Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 1983) (mere fact that tender
offer affects market price of stock does not mean tender offer scheme is manipulative);
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 628 (D. Md. 1982) (litigants may
not employ S 14(e) to challenge either substance of tender offer or effects of offer on forces
of supply and demand in market).
... See infra text accompanying notes 106 & 107.
"0 See infra text accompanying note 107.
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bids, the bidding strategy nevertheless may harm a target company's
shareholders by denying the shareholders any benefits that could accrue
to the shareholders as a result of a bidding war between competing tender
offerors. 17 The Radol court, in determining whether United States Steel's
two-tier pricing structure was manipulative in violation of section 14(e),
did not confine its analysis to the full disclosure emphasis of the Santa
Fe definition of manipulation but considered whether the two-tier pricing
arrangement inhibited competitive bids." 8 At least one other court apply-
ing the Santa Fe definition of manipulation to tender offers similarly has
considered the effect of a tender offer transaction on competitive bids.0 9
Courts' departures from the strict Santa Fe emphasis on full disclosure
reflect the general dissatisfaction with the Santa Fe definition of manipula-
tion in the tender offer context and indicate that courts may encourage
,0, See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26-37 (1977) (sole purpose of S 14(e)
is to ensure full disclosure to enable investors to make informed investment decisions).
In enacting the Williams Act, Congress determined that full disclosure by tender offerors
would alert target shareholders of impending takeover attempts and thus would enable
shareholders to make informed investment decisions whether to sell their securities or to
await a prospective tender offer. See supra note 8 (legislative history of Williams Act).
Although disclosure may protect shareholder interests by alerting shareholders of impending
takeover activity, some fully disclosed tender offer transactions nevertheless may affect
adversely shareholder interests if the fully disclosed transaction inhibits competing tender
offer bidders. See Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, supra note 85, at 1041 (auctioneer-
ing between competing tender offerors ensures that takeover firm will value target's shares
more highly than competing offeror and thus will pay higher premium). Competing tender
offers generally enable shareholders to receive the highest possible price for their tendered
shares. See id. Since Congress also enacted the Williams Act to protect shareholders' in-
terests in receiving the highest possible price for their securities, courts should construe
the definition of manipulation to proscribe tender offer transactions that impede competing
bids. See supra note 8 (Congress passed Williams Act to equate bargaining power of
shareholders and offerors and to protect shareholders' interests in takeover attempts); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 78n(dX6) (1976) (when shareholders tender shares exceeding offeror's solicita-
tion of shares, offeror must take and pay for shares on pro rata basis to ensure each tender-
ing shareholder highest possible price); id. S 78n(d)(7) (when offeror increases consideration
during effective period of tender offer, offeror must pay all tendering shareholders highest
tender offer price); 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-13 (1982) (rule lOb-13 prohibits offeror from purchas-
ing target's securities during tender offer on open market thus ensuring that shareholders
will receive tender offer benefits); cf. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 373-77
(6th Cir. 1981) (court invalidated option agreement between target and white knight that
imposed artificial ceiling on price hostile competing offeror would pay for target shares).
108 See 534 F. Supp. at 1313.
10 See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1981) (lockup
agreement between target company and white knight is manipulative if it impedes com-
peting bidders); see also Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1982) (although
controlling corporation had power to elect target's board of directors, controlling corpora-
tion's failure to withhold announcement of tender offer prior to release of favorable finan-
cial information of target did not discourage competing white knight offeror). Contra Mar-
tin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630-31 (D. Md. 1982) (litigant may
not use S 14(e) to challenge tender offer effects on forces of supply and demand in market
without alleging material nondisclosure).
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free market tender offer competition to protect target shareholders'
investments.110
Notwithstanding necessary expansion of the Santa Fe manipulation
definition, litigants will continue to have difficulty establishing section
14(e) manipulation claims because Santa Fe also requires plaintiffs to prove
that an individual intended to deceive investors by employing a particular
scheme.1 Generally, plaintiffs attempt to establish a prima facie case of
section 14(e) manipulation by proving that a tender offeror intended to
affect artificially the price of a target's securities. 2 Since courts rarely
consider the effects of a tender offer transaction on the forces of supply
and demand in the marketplace, litigants have had difficulty proving an
offeror's intent to deceive under the Santa Fe definition of manipulation.1
The case of Billard v. Rockwell International Corp."' clearly
110 See supra note 107 (competing tender offers ensure target shareholders will receive
highest possible price for their shares). Congress previously recognized the importance of
maintaining a free market economy and enacted the Sherman Act to prohibit any person
from contracting or conspiring to restrain trade or commerce. See 15 U.S.C. SS 1-7 (1976).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits any individual from following a course of market
conduct designed to obtain or to maintain power to exclude competition in a particular
trade or commerce. See id. S 1; L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 7 (1977).
In assessing a firm's market conduct, courts involved in antitrust litigation evaluate a firm's
responses to the forces of supply and demand in the marketplace and determine whether
the market responses stifle competition. See id. S 6(c). Courts generally do not characterize
conduct as anticompetitive solely on the basis of market effect and, therefore, courts will
consider a firm's motive or purpose before characterizing market conduct as anticompetitive.
See id. Since courts considering antitrust issues evaluate both a firm's market conduct and
market purpose to determine whether a particular conduct is anticompetitive, courts assessing
manipulative tender offer conduct could interpose antitrust principles of competition on
the Santa Fe formulation of manipulation, which similarly stresses intentional conduct. See
id.; Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 480 US. 462, 476-77 (1977). By interposing a large body
of antitrust case law on the Santa Fe definition of manipulation, courts could draw useful
analogies between anticompetitive market conduct in restraint of trade and anticompetitive
tender offer conduct in restraint of competing bids to avoid formulating extensive tender
offer economic market analyses.
... See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977) (intentional deception
is essential element of S 14(e) manipulation claim;, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S.
1, 26-27, 35-37 (1977) (same; infra text accompanying notes 112-113.
"' See Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977); supra text accompany-
ing note 18.
1 See 3 Loss, supra note 72, at 1552. The SEC previously has stated that a court nor-
mally may find manipulative purpose by drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence.
See Federal Corp., 25 S.E.C. 227, 230 (1947). Since one cannot ascertain an individual's true
intention or motive in the absence of an actual admission, the SEC and courts have recognized
that effective application of the antifraud provisions requires courts to draw inferences
from litigants' circumstantial evidence of an individual's purpose or motive. See 3 Loss,
supra note 72, at 1552 (citing SEC and court decisions allowing litigant to prove purpose
or motive by circumstantial evidence). Although many litigants have attempted to prove
that a tender offeror intended to deceive investors by circumstantial evidence of market
activity, most courts have not considered the effects of tender offers on the force of supply
and demand in the marketplace. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
683 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1982).
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demonstrates the problems that litigants have faced in establishing a sec-
tion 14(e) claim under the Santa Fe formulation of manipulation. In Billard,
the Rockwell International Corporation entered into an agreement with
Collins Radio Company in which Rockwell agreed to invest in Collins and
to provide managerial assistance."' In return, Collins issued Rockwell two
new series of securities that included an issue of preferred stock, enabl-
ing Rockwell to elect a majority of the Collins board of directors.' 6 Col-
lins' shareholders approved the agreement although Rockwell expressly
informed the shareholders that Rockwell might choose later to merge Col-
lins into Rockwell by obtaining two-thirds of Collins common shares in
compliance with Iowa's statutory merger provision.1 1 7 Within two years
of the agreement, Collins' financial situation had improved and Rockwell
decided to make }a tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of Collins
common stock at twenty-five dollars per share.' 8 If Collins' shareholders
tendered two-thirds of their outstanding shares, Rockwell would ac-
complish a statutory merger."9 Rockwell publicly announced its intention
to make a bid for Collins, stating in the announcement that Collins was
demonstrating a substantial earnings improvement without specifying Col-
lins' fourth quarter earnings.'2 ° Shortly thereafter, Rockwell formalized
the tender offer and fully disclosed Collins' earnings.' Collins' shareholders
tendered seventy-five percent of the outstanding shares of Collins com-
mon stock, enabling Rockwell to achieve a statutory merger of Collins
into Rockwell at a cash price of twenty-five dollars per share." After the
merger, former shareholders of Collins filed suit against Rockwell alleg-
ing that Rockwell had violated sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the '34 Act by
failing to disclose Collins' favorable fourth quarter earnings information
prior to Rockwell's formal tender offer announcement."' The plaintiffs
alleged that Rockwell's pre-tender offer announcement froze the price of
"I Id. at 53.
I's Id.
1" Id.; see IOWA CODE S 496A.70 (1970). Under Iowa's statutory merger provision, a com-
pany's board of directors may approve a proposed merger with another company but first
must obtain shareholder approval to achieve the merger. See id. The board of directors
may obtain shareholder approval upon receiving an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds
of the company's outstanding shares. See id.
"1 683 F.2d at 53.
119 Id.
11 Id. Rockwell International Corporation announced its intent to make a tender offer
for Collins Radio Company ten days before Rockwell announced a formal tender offer. Id.
at 53-54. Since Rockwell controlled Collins board of directors, Rockwell had access to Col-
lins' financial information before Rockwell announced the proposed tender offer. Id at 53.
When Rockwell announced its intention to make a tender offer for Collins, it did not disclose
Collins' fourth quarter earnings information but did state that Collins was demonstrating
substantial earnings improvement. Id. Rockwell fully disclosed Collins' fourth quarter earnings
information in the formal tender offer material. Id. at 54.
"I Id. at 54.
122 Id.
" Id.; see 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b), 78n(e) (1976) (§ 10(b) and 14(e) of '34 Act).
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Collins shares at twenty-five dollars per share because prospective traders
would realize that a successful Rockwell bid would enable Rockwell to
achieve a statutory merger at a cash price of twenty-five dollars per
share." The plaintiffs also alleged that if Rockwell had disclosed Collins'
earnings prior to Rockwell's pre-tender offer announcement, the price of
Collins shares would have risen to thirty-five dollars per share.1 25 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.2 ' The district court determined that Rockwell had
no duty to disclose Collins' favorable fourth quarter earnings information
before announcing its intent to make a bid for Collins." Furthermore,
the district court noted that Rockwell had no duty to await the market's
reaction to Collins' fourth quarter earnings information before announc-
ing the tender offer for Collins."
On appeal, the Second Circuit similarly rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment by concluding that Rockwell had disclosed Collins' earnings prior
to Rockwell's formal tender offer announcement. 29 Initially, the Billard
court reasoned that Rockwell's announcement of intent to make a bid for
Collins could not have frozen the price of Collins stock at twenty-five
dollars per share unless the market believed that twenty-five dollars ac-
curately reflected the value of Collins shares.'0 The Second Circuit stated
1" 683 F2d at 54.
125 Id.
12" See Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 526 F. Supp. 218, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd., 683
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1982).
127 Id. at 220-21.
12 Id. at 220.
11 683 F.2d at 54-55. Apparently, the Billard court determined that Rockwell's pre-
tender offer announcement had no prohibited effect on the price of Collins shares. See id.
The Second Circuit, therefore, rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Rockwell's premature
announcement froze the price of Collins pre-tender offer shares. See id. In particular, the
Billard court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Collins stock was worth more than
Rockwell's bid price because the argument was merely inferential and not factual. See id.
at 54. See generally 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.08 (1982) (ap-
pellate acceptance of factual but not inferential allegations). By refusing to accept the plain-
tiffs' argument concerning the alleged value of Collins shares, the Billard court effectively
ignored the possibility that Rockwell's announcement artificially affected the price of Col-
lins shares. See 683 F.2d at 54-55; supra note 107 (inhibiting tender offer competition may
affect shareholders' interests adversely because competition ensures highest possible bid
price for target shares).
12 683 F.2d at 55. The Billard court determined that Rockwell's pre-tender offer an-
nouncement could not have frozen the price of Collins shares unless the shareholders believed
that the tender offer price accurately reflected the value of their shares. Id. Initially the
court noted that any shareholder believing that the $25 bid price undervalued Collins shares
would have declined to tender to Rockwell. Id. If the Rockwell offer had failed, the court
reasoned that a shareholder believing that $25 dollars undervalued Collins' share price would
have expected either a renewed higher bid price or the plaintiffs' predicted increase in
share price to $35 per share. Id. The Billard court further concluded that any shareholder
holding the plaintiffs' optimistic view of the value of Collins shares would have felt pro-
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that all tender offerors hope to freeze the price of a target company's
stock at the bid price."' The court also noted that any resultant tender
offer freeze represents shareholders' judgment that the bid price accurate-
ly reflects or exceeds the value of their shares."2 The Second Circuit also
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Rockwell should have withheld an-
nouncement of its intent to make a bid for Collins for a period of time
to enable the market to absorb Collins' favorable financial earnings
information.' 3 The Billard court noted that the Rockwell tender offer,
in effect for forty days after the release of Collins' earnings information,
allowed the market ample opportunity to absorb Collins' favorable finan-
cial information. 4 Additionally, the Second Circuit determined that
Rockwell's failure to withhold announcement of its intent to make a bid
for Collins, prior to the release of Collins' earnings, did not constitute
a manipulative device in violation of the '34 Act.' 5 The Billard court, rely-
ing on the Santa Fe definition of manipulation, concluded that an announce-
ment of a genuine tender offer does not create an artificial impact on
market activity.'36 The court stated that the announcement of a genuine
tender offer does not lead potential traders to believe that a market ex-
ists when in fact no market exists.'37
Since Rockwell disclosed Collins' favorable fourth quarter earnings
upon formally announcing the tender offer for Collins, the Billard court
did not analyze extensively whether the pre-tender offer announcement
artifically affected the price of Collins shares.'38 The Billard court merely
determined that Rockwell's disclosure of Collins' earnings, upon announce-
ment of the formal bid, enabled the market to absorb Collins' financial
information during the effective period of the tender offer.' 9 Although
the court noted that the pre-tender offer announcement may have frozen
the price of Collins shares at a price representing the shareholders' judg-
ment of the value of their shares, the Billard court did not indicate that
tected in declining to tender to Rockwell because even if the bid were successful, the floor
price of Collins shares would have been $25. Id. The court reasoned that if a shareholder
believed, however, that the $25 bid price approximated or exceeded the true value of Col-
lins shares, the shareholder would have perceived a risk in refusing to tender to Rockwell
for a premium price. Id. By considering the shareholders' alternative tender offer decisions,
the Billard court focused on the tender offer pressures that shareholders faced in deciding
whether to tender their shares pursuant to Rockwell's formal bid but did not evaluate possible
pre-tender offer pressures that the shareholders faced after Rockwell announced its inten-
tion to bid for Collins. See id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
", Id. at 55-56.




I" See id. at 55; supra note 130 (Billard court's assessment of shareholders' alternative
formal tender offer decisions).
"' 683 F.2d at 56.
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Rockwell's pre-tender offer announcement otherwise could have affected
market activity.4 ' Since the Second Circuit refused to accept the plain-
tiffs' allegation that Rockwel's pre-tender offer announcement artificial-
ly froze the price of Collins shares, the plaintiffs could not prove that
Rockwell intended to freeze the price of Collins shares at an artificial
price.""
The Billard decision clearly demonstrates the problems that litigants
face under section 14(e) in attempting to prove a tender offeror's intent
to deceive investors."' Since section 14(e) prohibits tender offerors from
employing any device intended to deceive investors or to manipulate stock
prices, courts should allow litigants to establish a prima facie case under
section 14(e) by circumstantial evidence tending to show unnatural market
activity in situations in which a tender offeror has a substantial direct
pecuniary interest in the alleged manipulative transaction.'" After a plain-
tiff has established a prima facie case under section 14(e) by circumstan-
tial evidence, the burden of proof should shift to the tender offeror to
show that the offeror did not intend to deceive investors or to manipulate
stock prices.4 Placing the burden of going forward on defendant tender
offerors with respect to the issue of intentional manipulation would en-
sure that courts would hear all relevant evidence concerning an alleged
manipulative practice without forcing the courts to analyze section 14(e)
claims solely on the basis of a tender offer's alleged artificial market
effects.'" Moreover, allowing litigants to prove an offeror's intentional
deception on the basis of circumstantial evidence would enhance courts'
efforts in effectively enforcing section 14(e) even in the absence of statutory
or administrative definitions of tender offer manipulation.'
... See id. at 55.
14 See id.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 111-13 (plaintiffs must prove offeror's intent to
deceive by circumstantial evidence of unnatural market activity).
11 See 3 Loss, supra note -2, at 1552-53 (prima facie case of manipulation exists when
litigant shows that individual has substantial direct pecuniary interest in success of pro-
posed offering and that individual has initiated series of transactions to accomplish success
of offering); see also Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 795 (2d Cir.
1969) (when person has substantial direct pecuniary interest in success of proposed tender
offer and takes active steps to effect rise in market, court may find prima facie case of
manipulative purpose), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
'" See 3 Loss, supra note 72, at 1552-53. Once a litigant has established that an alleged
manipulator had both the motive to manipulate and had initiated a requisite series of trans-
actions to accomplish the alleged manipulative purpose, the burden of going forward with
the evidence shifts to the accused manipulator to rebut the litigant's prima facie case of
manipulative purpose. See id.
"4I See supra text accompanying notes 111-13 (litigants' difficulties establishing prima
facie case of manipulation), 143-144 (prima facie approach in manipulation cases allows courts
to infer manipulative purpose after plaintiff proves defendant has direct substantial pecuniary
interest in accomplishing success of series of transactions).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 65-74 (Supreme Court definition of manipulation
does not proscribe conceivable tender offer conduct that adversely may affect shareholders'
interests).
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Recent litigation under section 14 (e) has indicated that courts have
not applied section 14(e) effectively to prohibit fraudulent or deceptive con-
duct in connection with tender offers.1 47 In the absence of affirmative
statutory or administrative definitions of tender offers, many tender of-
ferors have avoided compliance with the Williams Act by initiating trans-
actions that are tender offers in substance but not in form. 48 Since courts
consistently have refused to apply the Williams Act to substantive tender
offers, the SEC has announced a proposed tender offer definition that
would force courts to apply the Williams Act to various transactions that
pressure investors into making uninformed investment decisions.'49 Although
the proposed tender offer definition would aid courts' enforcement efforts
substantially, the lack of a satisfactory definition of manipulation, in con-
nection with tender offers, will continue to impede effective application
of section 14(e)."01 Neither Congress nor the SEC has defined manipula-
tion in the context of tender offers."' The Supreme Court's definition of
manipulation, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, is an
unsatisfactory definition of manipulation in the context of tender offers
because it does not proscribe conceivable tender offer situations that
adversely affect shareholder interests."' In particular, the Santa Fe defini-
tion of manipulation focuses on an offeror's intent to affect artificially
market activity but does not encompass situations in which a bidder has
disclosed fully a bidding strategy that effectively inhibits competing tender
offers." For effective enforcement of the Williams Act's mandate of
shareholder protection, courts should construe the Santa Fe definition of
manipulation to prohibit any conduct on the part of a tender offeror de-
signed to inhibit competing bids.54 Additionally, courts should re-evaluate
the burden of proof under section 14(e) manipulation claims and establish
that plaintiffs may prove a prima facie case of manipulation by producing
circumstantial evidence showing that a tender offeror has produced un-
natural market activity and that the tender offeror has a substantial direct
pecuniary interest in the alleged market manipulation." Requiring a tender
offeror to introduce evidence to rebut a plaintiffs prima facie case on the
147 See supra text accompanying notes 37-49 (permitting tender offer practices that are
violative of Williams Act in substance but not in form), 65-74 (failure of Santa Fe definition
of manipulation to proscribe tender offer conduct that adversely affects shareholders' in-
terests), 102-07 (failure of Santa Fe definition to proscribe fully disclosed tender offer con-
duct that impedes competing bids), 111-13 (hesitancy of courts to consider market effects
of tender offer transaction).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 37-41, 49-57.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
,' See supra text accompanying note 65.
151 Id.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 65-74, 102-07.
15 See supra text accompanying notes 102-07.
15 See supra notes 107 & 110 (encouraging competition between offerors supports con-
gressional purpose of protecting shareholder interests).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
[Vol. 40:1199
TAKEOVER DEVELOPMENTS
issue of intent to deceive investors or to manipulate market activity allows
courts to consider crucial evidence under the Santa Fe formulation of
manipulation that courts effectively have excluded under previous sec-
tion 14(e) litigation. '- As long as courts continue to rely on Santa Fe and
focus on a tender offeror's intent to deceive investors or to manipulate
market activity, effective application of the Williams Act requires courts
to consider all relevant evidence concerning an offeror's intent.57 Shifting
the burden of proof to the tender offeror to require the offeror to show
that he did not intend either to deceive investors or to manipulate market
activity would enable courts to apply the Williams Act effectively to pro-





' See supra text accompanying notes 111-13 (litigants' difficulties establishing
manipulative purpose), 142-46 (re-evaluating burden of proof under 5 14(e) may enable courts
to apply Williams Act effectively in absence of definition of tender offer manipulation).
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